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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James A. Cochran appeals from his judgment of conviction for sexual abuse of a 
minor under the age of sixteen. He asserts that the district court erred by instructing the 
jury that he could be found guilty of sex abuse of a minor when he was never charged 
with this offense, and where it is not a lesser included offense of lewd conduct with a 
minor. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On April 23, 2006, thirteen-year-old A.H. reported that she had been sexually 
abused by Mr. Cochran. (PSI, p.2.) She stated that on that date, she and E.C., 
Mr. Cochran's stepdaughter, went for a drive with Mr. Cochran and he purchased 
alcohol for them. (PSI, p.2.) According to A.H., Mr. Cochran talked with her about sex 
and how there were "different ways" to have sex. (PSI, p.2.) 
The girls and Mr. Cochran then returned to his residence and they all decided to 
sleep in the same bed. (PSI, p.2.) According to A.H., while E.C. was asleep, 
Mr. Cochran touched her vagina and also touched her breasts. (PSI, p.2.) 
Mr. Cochran was charged with one count of lewd conduct. (R., p.12.) The 
Information alleged: 
[Mr. Cochran] had manual-genital contact with a child with initials A.J.H. 
birth date of with the intent of arousing, appeal to or gratifying 
the lusts, pa xual desire of himself, or said minor, while at or 
near Kooskia, ldaho County, State of Idaho, in violation of I.C. § 18-1508. 
(R., p.12.) He was not charged with any other type of misconduct. At trial, A.H. testified 
that, when she got into bed with Mr. Cochran, she was "touched inappropriately," 
meaning that Mr. Cochran touched her vaginal area with this fingers. (Trial Tr., p.69, 
L.9 - p.70, L.1.) She testified that his fingers went inside her vagina. (Trial Tr., p.70, 
Ls.15-18.) She also testified that he touched her on her breasts. (Trial Tr., p.72, Ls.1 l- 
15.) These were the only allegations of inappropriate conduct made by A.H at trial. 
The State requested a "lesser included" offense instruction of sexual abuse of a 
minor. (Supp. R., p.21.) No objection was made to this instruction. The jury returned 
with a verdict of not guilty on the lewd conduct charge, but with a verdict of guilty on the 
"lesser included" charge. (R., pp.78-79.) 
Mr. Cochran filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that the district court made 
an error of law by instructing the jury on sexual abuse of a minor. (R., p.109; Supp. R., 
p.85.) Mr. Cochran asserted that the jury should never have been given this instruction 
because sexual abuse of a minor was not a lesser included offense of lewd conduct. 
(Supp. R., p.85.) The district court denied the motion, holding that sexual abuse of a 
minor was a lesser included offense and the evidence supported such an instruction. 
(Sent.Tr.,p.18,Ls.l-9;p.20,L.21 -p.22,L.2.) 
While the initial notice of appeal was untimely from the judgment of conviction, 
the district court re-entered the judgment of conviction pursuant to a stipulation in post- 
conviction and Mr. Cochran timely appealed. (Augmentation.) Mr. Cochran now 
appeals, and he asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion for a new 
trial, or, alternatively, committed fundamental error, because the jury should not have 
been instructed that sexual abuse of a minor was a lesser included offense of lewd 
conduct. 
Did the district court err by instructing the jury that sexual abuse of a minor was a lesser 
included offense of lewd conduct? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By lnstructina The Jury On Sexual Abuse Of A Minor Under 
The Aae Of Sixteen Because It Was Not A Lesser Included Offense Of Lewd Conduct 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Cochran asserts that the district court erred by instructing the jury on sexual 
abuse of a minor because, under the facts of this case, it is not a lesser included 
offense of lewd conduct. 
B. The District Court Erred By Instructing The Jury On Sexual Abuse Of A Minor 
Under The Aae Of Sixteen Because It Was Not A Lesser Included Offense Of 
Lewd Conduct 
1. This Issue Is Preserved For Ameal 
Admittedly, counsel for Mr. Cochran did not object to the inclusion of an 
instruction on sexual abuse of a minor. However, the issue is preserved for two 
reasons: ?)  the issue is one of fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on 
appeal; and 2) it was raised in Mr. Cochran's motion for a new trial. 
The issue may be addressed on appeal because instructing the jury on sexual 
abuse of a minor constituted fundamental error because it amounted to a constructive 
amendment of the Information. An error generally is not reviewable if raised for the first 
time on appeal. State v. Sheahan, 139 ldaho 267, 277, 77 P.3d 956, 966 (2003). 
Moreover, ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b) provides that "[nlo party may assign as error the 
giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects 
and the grounds of the objection." I.C.R. 30(b). 
However, ldaho courts have traditionally reviewed "fundamental" errors on 
appeal, even when no objection was raised at trial. Stafe v. Haggard, 94 ldaho 249, 
486 P.2d 260 (1971). An error is fundamental when it "so profoundly distorts the trial 
that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his fundamental right to 
due process." State v. Lavy, 121 ldaho 842,844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). 
The ldaho Supreme Court has recently ruled that, despite Idaho Criminal Rule 
30(b), a challenge may be made to jury instructions so long as the error is 
"fundamental." Stafe v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 743, 748, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007). In 
Anderson, the court stated: 
Since the district court committed error, it must be determined whether 
ldaho appellate courts may review fundamental errors in jury instructions 
even when no objection was made at trial. It may be argued that 
permitting review of fundamental errors would defeat the purpose of Rule 
30(b) because it would allow review of jury instruction errors even when 
no objection was made. It should be noted, though, that permitting Idaho's 
appellate courts to review fundamental errors in jury instructions does not 
render ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b) a nullity, as Rule 30(b) would still forbid 
review of any error not so egregious that it produced manifest injustice by 
violating the defendant's due process rights under the federal or ldaho 
constitutions. Presumably, since most jury instruction errors do not double 
as manifestly unjust due process violations, ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b) 
would apply in most cases in which no timely objection followed a trial 
court's error. Our holding therefore has not reduced Criminal Rule 30(b) to 
a nullity. 
Because the jury instruction may be subject to limited review for due 
process violations that resulted in manifest injustice, the issue then turns 
to whether such a fundamental error occurred. Again, a fundamental error 
is a due process violation that produced manifest injustice. State v. Lavy, 
121 ldaho 842,844,828 P.2d 871,873 (1992). 
Id. The error in this case is fundamental, as it amounts to a violation of Mr. Cochran's 
right to due process because it is a constructive amendment of the lnformation. 
"Although the rules for amending an lnformation in this state are liberal, see 
I.C. § 19-1420, any amendment which charges the accused with a crime of greater 
degree or a differenf nafure than that for which the accused was bound over for trial by 
the committing magistrate is barred by the ldaho Constitution." State v. Colwell, 124 
ldaho 560, 566, 861 P.2d ?225, 1231 (Ct. App. 1993). (citing IDAHO CONST. ART. I § 8; 
O'Neill, 118 ldaho at 249, 796 P.2d at 121; Sfate v. McKeehan, 91 ldaho 808,430 P.2d 
886 (1967)). See also I.C. 3 19-1420 (prohibiting the charging of a different and distinct 
offense by way of an amended lnformation). "Where a variance alters the lnformation 
to the extent that an amendment of the same scope would be prohibited, the failure to 
hold the variance fatal would necessarily undermine these statutory and constitutional 
limitations placed on amendments." Id. (citing 2 W. LAFAVE & J. ISREAL, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, § 19.2, AT 469 (1984)). "There is a marked distinction between' a 'mere 
variance' and a variance which is automatically fatal because it amounts to an 
impermissible 'constructive amendment."' Id. (citing 2 w. LAFAVE & J. ISREAL, CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, 9 19.2, AT 469-72 (1 984)). 
ldaho Criminal Rule 7 states, "[tlhe court may permit a complaint, an information 
or indictment to be amended at any time before the prosecution rests if no additional or 
different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." 
I.C.R. 7 (emphasis added). As set forth in the next section, sexual abuse of a minor 
was not a lesser included offense in this case. Because the sexual abuse charge is not 
a lesser included charge of lewd conduct, the State would not have been permitted to 
amend the lnformation to add this crime. Therefore, instructing the jury on the charge 
amounted to a constructive amendment to the lnformation. 
In a criminal case, procedural due process does not guarantee errorless trials, 
but it does at least ensure that criminal trials shall be fundamentally fair. State v. 
Gilman, 105 ldaho 891, 893, 673 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983). Fairness requires 
that a criminal defendant be tried only upon charges of which he or she has notice. Id. 
Additionally, Article I, Section 8 of the ldaho Constitution provides that "no person shall 
be held to answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on 
presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor, 
after a commitment by a magistrate." An accused is therefore denied his or her 
constitutional right to a preliminary hearing where an indictment or information is filed or 
subsequently amended charging a crime of a greater degree or of a different nature 
than that for which he or she was held by the committing magistrate. State v. O'Neill, 
118 ldaho 244, 249, 796 P.2d 121, 126 (1990); State v. McKeehan, 91 ldaho 808, 817, 
430 P.2d 886, 895 (1967). 
Constructive amendments, therefore, violate due process. Because the jury 
instruction in this case constituted a constructive amendment, giving the instruction 
violated Mr. Cochran's right to due process. When jury instructions violate due process, 
the issue may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Sfafe v. Anderson, 144 ldaho 
743,748, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007). 
Further, Mr. Cochran filed a motion for a new trial. ldaho Criminal Rule 34 
requires that a motion for a new trial, on a ground other than newly discovered 
evidence, be filed within fourteen days after the verdict, finding of guilt or imposition of 
sentence. I.C.R. 34 In this case, the motion was filed August 28, 2007. (R., p.109.) 
The sentencing hearing occurred on October 12, 2007. ( R  p . 6 )  Mr. Cochran's 
motion was filed prior to the imposition of sentence in this case and was therefore filed 
within fourteen days after the imposition of sentence. This issue was preserved by the 
filing of the motion for a new trial on a proper basis. 
ldaho Code § 19-2604 sets forth the reasons for granting a motion for a new trial. 
It states, in relevant part: 
When a verdict has been rendered against the defendant the court may, 
upon his application, grant a new trial in the following cases only: 
5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred 
in the decision of any question of law arising during the course of the trial. 
I.C. § 19-2406(5). As Mr. Cochran's claim was that the district court misdirected the 
jury, his motion for a new trial was proper and preserved the issue. 
2. Sex Abuse Of A Minor Under The Ane Of Sixteen Is Not A Lesser Included 
Offense Of Lewd Conduct In This Case 
A lesser included offense is one which is necessarily committed while committing 
the crime charged or the essential elements of which are alleged as the manner or 
means by which the charged offense has been committed. State v. Drennon, 126 ldaho 
346, 352, 883 P.2d 704, 710 (Ct. App. 1994). When deciding whether an offense is 
necessarily included in the charged offense, the trial court must consider whether the 
facts alleged in the pleading instrument and the evidence adduced at trial show that the 
included offense occurred during commission of the charged offense. Id. Whether a 
crime is a lesser included offense of the crime charged is a question of law over which 
this Court exercises free review. Id. 
The crime of lewd conduct with a minor specifically includes several types of 
sexual contact, including genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital 
contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual-genital contact. I.C. 9 18- 
1508. Sexual abuse of a child requires proof of physical contact, nof amounting fo lewd 
conducf, which is intended to gratify the lust or sexual desire of the actor. See I.C. § 18- 
1506(l)(b), (3) (emphasis added). Sexual abuse of a minor is not necessarily 
committed while committing the crime of lewd conduct. Sfafe v. Colwell, 124 ldaho 560, 
565, 861 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Ct. App. 1993). However, depending upon the facts alleged 
in the information and the evidence adduced at trial, the crime of sexual abuse may be 
considered by the jury as a lesser included offense if there is evidence that the included 
offense occurred during the commission of the charged offense. Id. See also Sfafe v. 
Fodge, 12$ ldaho 192, $95, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992); State v. O'Neill, ? 18 ldaho 244, 
250, 796 P.2d 121, 127 (1990); Drennon, 126 ldaho at 354, 883 P.2d at 712. 
In this case, sex abuse of a minor is not a lesser included offense of lewd 
conduct. Mr. Cochran was charged with lewd conduct for the following act: 
[Mr. Cochran] had manual-genital contact with a child with initials A.J.H. 
birth date of 12/28/1992, with the intent of arousing, appeal to or gratifying 
the lusts, passions or sexual desire of himself, or said minor, while at or 
near Kooskia, ldaho County, State of ldaho, in violation of I.C. § 18-1508. 
(R., p.12.) At trial, A.H. testified that, when she got into bed with Mr. Cochran, she was 
"touched inappropriately", meaning that Mr. Cochran touched her vaginal area with this 
fingers. (Trial Tr., p.69, L.9 - p.70, L.I.) She testified that his fingers went inside her 
vagina. (Trial Tr., p.70, Ls.15-18.) She also testified that he touched her on her 
breasts. (Trial Tr., p.72, Ls.11-15.) These are the only allegations of inappropriate 
conduct. The allegation that Mr. Cochran inserted his fingers into A.H.'s vagina would 
satisfy the element of manual-genital conduct necessary for lewd conduct. The 
allegation that Mr. Cochran touched A.H.'s breasts would satisfy the element of physical 
contact not amounting to lewd conduct necessary for sex abuse. However, touching 
A.H.'s breasts does not amount to lewd conduct as it is not genital-genital contact, oral- 
genital contact, anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual-anal contact, or manual- 
genital contact. See I.C. § 18-1508. Sex abuse of a minor is not, therefore, a lesser 
included offense of lewd conduct under the facts of this case. 
In Colwell, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court's instruction 
went beyond creating a "mere variance" between the conduct alleged in the lnformation 
and the conduct proved at trial; it amounted to a constructive amendment of the 
lnformation to charge Colwell with additional crimes that were separate and distinct from 
the crime explicitly alleged. Id. The same conclusion is required here. In Colwell: 
Although the state had charged Colwell with a single, specific act of lewd 
conduct, the state also presented live and video-taped statements from 
A.C. describing other, uncharged acts occurring at various times and 
places during the two-year period since Colwell and A.C.'s mother 
separated. This evidence consisted of statements by A.C. that Colwell had 
sexual intercourse with her on other occasions, some possibly while she 
visited him in Seattle, Washington; that once, while he was wearing a 
bathrobe, Colwell had taken her hand and tried to place it on his penis; 
that he often rubbed cocoa butter on her hips, buttocks and breasts to 
help eliminate her stretch marks; that he regularly trimmed her pubic hairs; 
that he made her douche herself, sometimes assisting her; and that he 
had spied on her while she was undressed in the bathroom. When Colwell 
took the stand, he denied all of A.C.'s accusations, except that he 
admitted he had applied cocoa butter "on her fanny side there and the 
back of her legs" to help with the stretch marks. 
Id. at 563, 861 P.2d at 7228. The Colwell jury was given a lesser included instruction 
on sex abuse of a minor, and the Court of Appeals held that giving the instruction was 
error because, "the jury was permitted to find that the incident giving rise to the charge 
of lewd conduct had not occurred, but nonetheless could find Colwell guilty of sexual 
abuse based upon evidence that he rubbed cocoa butter on A.C.'s breasts and 
buttocks, that he trimmed her pubic hairs, or that he assisted her douche." Id. at 565, 
861 P.2d at 1230. The same is true in this case. The jury could have concluded (and 
apparently did find) that Mr. Cochran never placed his fingers in A.H.'s vagina but that 
he touched her breasts. 
Mr. Cochran acknowledges that the Court of Appeals has appeared to suggest 
that when an act of sexual abuse occurs during an act of lewd conduct, sexual abuse 
can be a lesser included offense. See e.g., id. (noting that it was error for the district 
court to instruct the jury on the sexual abuse allegations, but suggesting that if the acts 
occurred "during the commission of the crime charged in the Information" and the jury 
was so instructed, there would be no error.) To the extent that the Court of Appeals has 
held that the mere fact that sexual abuse occurs during an act of lewd conduct renders 
it a lesser included offense, these cases should be disavowed. 
It is well recognized that the doctrine of stare decisis need not be strictly adhered 
to if the precedent in question is manifestly wrong, has proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise, or if overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice. State v. Humphreys, 134 ldaho 657, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) 
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 
(1990)). To the extent that the Court of Appeals has held that the mere fact that sexual 
abuse occurs during an act of lewd conduct renders it a lesser included offense, such 
holdings are manifestly wrong and any case holding to the contrary should be 
overturned. 
A lesser included offense is one which is necessarily committed while committing 
the crime charged or the essential elements of which are alleged as the manner or 
means by which the charged offense has been committed. State v. Drennon, 126 Idaho 
346,352,883 P.2d 704,710 (Ct. App. 1994). The mere fact that an act of sexual abuse 
occurs during an act of lewd conduct does not mean that the act was "necessarily" 
committed during the act or that it was the "manner or means" by which the charged 
offense was committed. The instant case is a good example. 
The alleged act of sexual abuse (touching A.H.'s breasts) was not "necessarily" 
committed while committing alleged act of lewd conduct (touching A.H.'s vagina) - 
Mr. Cochran could have committed the act of lewd conduct alleged in this case without 
committing the act of sexual abuse and it was, therefore, not necessary. A good 
comparison is the example of battery. Battery is a lesser included offense of 
aggravated battery. See I.C. 3 18-907 (noting that aggravated battery is a "battery" with 
an additional element.) To commit an aggravated battery, a defendant "necessarily" 
commits a battery; an aggravated battery may not occur without a battery occurring. 
However, an act of lewd conduct may occur without an act of sexual abuse occurring. 
Furthermore, the act of sexual abuse was not the "manner or means" by which 
the charged offense was committed in this case. The alleged act of lewd conduct in this 
case was conducted by the "manner or means" of manual-genital contact. (R., p.12.) 
The act of touching A.H.'s breasts was a separate act, not the manner or means by 
which the charged conduct occurred. Mr. Cochran did not commit lewd conduct by 
means of sexual abuse. 
In order to be a lesser included offense, sexual abuse must "necessarily" be 
committed during the charged act, or be the "manner or means" by which the charged 
act occurs. Neither is present in the instant case, and therefore sexual abuse of a minor 
is not a lesser included offense in this case. The district court violated Mr. Cochran's 
right to due process by giving the lesser included instruction, which amounted to a 
constructive amendment. The district court therefore erred by denying Mr. Cochran's 
motion for a new trial, or, alternatively, committed fundamental error by so instructing 
the jury. Mr. Cochran therefore requests that his conviction for sexual abuse of a minor 
be vacated and his case be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Cochran requests that his conviction for sexual abuse of a minor be vacated 
and his case be dismissed. 
DATED this 27'h day of April, 2009. 
Deputy t a t e ~ ~ ~ e l l a t e  Public Defender 
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